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TRACES OF A LIBERTARIAN
THEORY OF PUNISHMENT
ERIK LUNA*
I.
Libertarians love free markets. An individual's right to exchange his
property by mutual agreement with others is considered a first principle
of libertarianism and the basis for the creation of wealth and the
achievement of social prosperity. In fact, there are very few
circumstances in which consensual deals among rights-holders would be
impermissible. When problems arise in business dealings, libertarians
find attractive the voluntary settlement of conflicts in lieu of legal
action, possibly through mechanisms of alternative dispute resolution.
Litigation is costly and unproductive, impeding free-market transactions
and interposing the judgments of those who have no rightful claim over
the dispute. Given the backlog in courts and a general distaste for
centralized decision making, "it makes sense to try to work problems
out without having a third party impose a solution."'
The same arguments would seem to apply in the arena of criminal
justice and, in particular, to plea bargaining, the dominant means of
resolving criminal cases in America today.
Plea bargains are preferable to mandatory litigation...
because compromise is better than conflict. Settlements
of civil cases make both sides better off; settlements of
criminal cases do so too. Defendants have many
procedural and substantive rights. By pleading guilty,
they sell these rights to the prosecutor, receiving
concessions they esteem more highly than the rights
surrendered.2
* Hugh B. Brown Chair in Law and Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney
College of Law. Co-Director, Utah Criminal Justice Center. My thanks to Troy Booher,
Timothy Lynch, Alice Ristroph, and conference participants for their comments, to Bethany
Rabe for research assistance, and to Michael O'Hear and Andrea Schneider for inviting me to
participate in Marquette University Law School's plea bargaining conference.
1. DAVID BOAZ, LIBERTARIANISM: A PRIMER 270 (1997).
2. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975
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How could a supporter of free markets object to a voluntary exchange
like this, with the defendant trading his constitutional rights for the
dismissal of charges or a reduced sentence? Assuming that the resulting
punishment conforms with its espoused justification of punishment-
supposedly retribution, or maybe compensation-the values of
libertarianism would seem to be served in full.
In the following pages, I will suggest that this understanding is
mistaken. A libertarian theory of punishment would not adopt a
particular justification such as retributive deserts or utilitarian
deterrence, and it certainly would not empower the state to impose its
own substantive rationale on those whose rights are implicated. Nor
would it authorize officials to trade in these individuals' rights without
their consent, as can occur under the practice of plea bargaining.
Instead, a true libertarian state would permit these individuals,
especially victims and offenders, to resolve criminal cases pursuant to
their own personal justifications for punishment, possibly by facilitating
party interactions through processes like restorative justice. From the
outset, however, it should be acknowledged that a comprehensive
statement of a libertarian theory of punishment is far beyond the scope
of this piece. All that can be done here is to outline a preliminary
argument, undoubtedly with holes and rough spots, beginning with a
brief summary of the underlying philosophy.
II.
Like many other political theories, libertarianism is concerned with
the use of force against individuals without their consent. It attempts to
delineate rules or principles about the permissible interaction among
free people, as well as between individuals and the state. Although
frequently portrayed as "right-wing," libertarianism is suspicious of all
forms of government action, whether it involves liberals reaching into a
person's pocketbook or conservatives peering into someone's bedroom.3
Indeed, libertarians come from a variety of perspectives in current
political debates-some leaning to the right, others to the left4-all
(1992) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining].
3. Libertarianism is also referred to as "classical liberalism"-not to be confused with
"modern liberalism" associated with, among other things, large-scale state redistribution of
wealth.
4. Compare ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974) [hereinafter
NOZICK, ANARCHY] and MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY (1982), with
G.A. COHEN, SELF-OWNERSHIP, FREEDOM, AND EQUALITY (1995) and MICHAEL OTSUKA,
[91:263
LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF PUNISHMENT
existing under a theoretical tent large enough to include both
consequentialists and non-consequentialists.
Regardless of starting point and political bent, there is a general
agreement that individuals are the fundamental unit of moral analysis
and exercise full self-ownership. "Over himself, over his own body and
mind," John Stuart Mill opined, "the individual is sovereign."5  For
consequentialist libertarians, from Mill to Milton Friedman, such
autonomy is essential for human flourishing, maximizing both personal
happiness and socioeconomic productivity in a comprehensive utility
function. 6 For non-consequentialist libertarians like Robert Nozick,
self-ownership is advocated not for its rule-utilitarian benefits but
instead as a deontological principle,7 sometimes premised on the
Kantian categorical imperative that individuals be treated as ends in
themselves and never merely as a means.
However it is arrived at, self-ownership signifies that an individual
has the right to use his body and mind as he sees fit-to eat, drink, think,
and say whatever he wants-more or less, complete discretion over his
mental and material faculties consistent with the same right residing
with all others. Self-ownership necessarily entails what are usually
described as property rights, the power to determine the disposition of
something, in this case, one's body and skills, applied through physical
and intellectual labor. When these are mixed with justly acquired
resources, 8 the resulting products are also owned by the individual, who
in turn may use these goods or voluntarily transfer them to others.
The consequences of libertarianism often seem mundane and
simplistic; for example, the choice to mow my own lawn, to contract
LIBERTARIANISM WITHOUT INEQUALITY (2003). See generally LEFT-LIBERTARIANISM
AND ITS CRITICS: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE (Peter Vallentyne & Hillel Steiner eds.,
2000). Although the definition of libertarianism is highly contested, the following will try to
provide an account premised on basic principles that seem to have some consensus among
libertarian theorists.
5. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 (John Gray ed.,
Humanities Press 1991) (1859).
6. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 59 (1995);
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 4 (1962); CHARLES MURRAY, WHAT IT
MEANS TO BE A LIBERTARIAN 18 (1997).
7. See, e.g., NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 30-33; see also RANDY E. BARNETT,
THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 14 (1998) [hereinafter
BARNETT, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY].
8. Although not pertinent to the present discussion, this raises the issue of the initial
acquisition of natural resources and, for instance, the so-called Lockean proviso that there be
"'enough and as good left in common for others."' See, e.g., NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note
4, at 174-82; OTSUKA, supra note 4, at 22-29.
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with my neighbor to do the same in his front yard, or to operate my own
landscaping business. Other results trouble a significant slice of society
but are begrudgingly (and only partially) permitted-the prerogative to
consume my fill of nicotine, alcohol, and adult pornography, so long as
no one else is endangered, as well as the ability to sell smokes, booze,
and smut to willing adults.9 Still other possibilities are prohibited
throughout much of America, such as the freedom to produce, trade,
and ingest various drugs (e.g., marijuana), to contract for sexual
relations and enter games of chance (i.e., prostitution and gambling),
and to end my own life voluntarily or hire someone to do it for me (e.g.,
euthanasia).' ° The essential claim in each of these cases is the same: a
property right in one's self and personal belongings. And the libertarian
basis for each transaction is identical: allowing "capitalist acts between
consenting adults.""
Libertarianism thus embraces a particularly robust, anti-paternalistic
conception of rights, which are held absolutely and equally by all
individuals. To be clear, however, much of what contemporary
discourse describes as a right would not be deemed as such by a
libertarian. 2 There would be no "right" to health care, for instance,
unless someone contracted for the relevant services, which would create
a property right." Moreover, there would be no "right" to prostitution
per se, but instead complete self-ownership and the right of each
9. Libertarianism does not contend, however, that those who lack the capacity to
consent (e.g., children) must have the right to prostitute themselves, consume intoxicating
substances, and so on.
10. There are exceptions. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.354 (2006) (permitting "a
licensed house of prostitution"); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2005) (allowing euthanasia); Noy
v. State, 83 P.3d 538, 543 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (residential possession of less than four
ounces of marijuana protected under state constitution).
11. NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 163; see also Murray N. Rothbard, The Future
of Capitalism, in MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY 419 (James H. Weaver ed., 1973).
12. See, e.g., BOAZ, supra note 1, at 64-65, 87-91.
13. A famous line of argument by Judith Jarvis Thomson, although on a different topic
(abortion), seems apt here:
If I am sick unto death, and the only thing that will save my life is the
touch of Henry Fonda's cool hand on my fevered brow, then all the same,
I have no right to be given the touch of Henry Fonda's cool hand on my
fevered brow. It would be frightfully nice of him to fly in from the West
Coast to provide it. It would be less nice, though no doubt well meant, if
my friends flew out to the West Coast and carried Henry Fonda back with
them. But I have no right at all against anybody that he should do this for
me.
Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 55 (1971).
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individual to control and use one's body. So conceived, libertarian
rights do not vary by subject matter, and their advocates are
unembarrassed by the upshot.
Some modern theorists have described rights as "trumps," "shields,"
and "side-constraints,"'' 4 but whatever the term, they are viewed by
libertarians as inviolable, setting boundaries for action. 5 Rights thereby
create a duty, an obligation of each individual to respect the rights of
others. Someone's ownership of himself and his possessions places a
moral constraint on my actions vis-A-vis that person's body and
property, namely, I may not violate or otherwise interfere with his rights
without his consent.'6 This nonaggression principle, as it is sometimes
called, seems commonsensical and corresponds with the old adage that
the right to swing my arm ends where your nose begins; actually, a
libertarian would argue that my freedom lapses well before the tip of
your nose, when a credible threat to violate your rights has been made.
At that point, an individual may act in self-defense to prevent such an
infringement. And if a violation has already occurred (e.g., someone
stole my wallet), an individual is justified in using force to vindicate his
right (e.g., my taking back the wallet). 7
So far, so good. Libertarianism is haunted, however, by the specter
of anarchy, that its conception of rights precludes government
altogether. "So strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise
the question of what, if anything, the state and its officials may do,"
Nozick posits in the preface to his magnum opus, Anarchy, State, and
Utopia. 8 "How much room do individual rights leave for the state?"' 9
No libertarian longs for a Hobbesian state of nature, where individuals
reside in constant fear and life is "nasty, brutish, and short,"20 but the
question remains how a state would arise and persist while respecting
these rights. Some theorists have attempted to resolve the issue through
14. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977) ("trumps");
Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415, 428-31 (1993)
("shields"); NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 29 ("side-constraints").
15. In situations of "metaphysical emergency"-where human survival is in grave peril,
such as mass famine-libertarian theorists concede that concerns about individual rights may
be inapplicable. See, e.g., BOAZ, supra note 1, at 84-87.
16. See, e.g., BOAZ, supra note 1, at 74-76; NOzICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 33-35.
17. See, e.g., BARNETT, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 176-81 (discussing
use of force to collect restitution or engage in self-defense).
18. NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at ix.
19. Id.
20. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 82 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Basil Blackwell 1960)
(1651).
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a social-contract metaphor, with individuals (hypothetically) agreeing to
a type of minimal state in order to protect their rights (and nothing
more),2' thereby obligating themselves to provide sufficient resources
for this limited government.
22
Nozick takes a different approach, arguing that a libertarian minimal
state would arise through an "invisible hand" mechanism, where
individuals would contract with private firms to defend their rights.
Eventually, a dominant protection agency would take on some core
characteristics of a state, such as a monopoly on most forms of
justifiable force and the protection of everyone within its jurisdiction.23
But none of this stems from intrinsic authority of the agency or its
successor state but only results from individuals enlisting it to defend
their rights. 24 To be sure, the argument for a rights-protective minimal
state is (concededly) ahistorical, and Nozick's philosophical moves (e.g.,
21. Cf. infra note 67 and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY
AND LEVIATHAN 21-23 (1975); JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA 217-21 (1988).
23. See NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 10-146 (describing in detail "dominant
protection agencies"). In the absence of the state, individuals would face the difficult,
resource-intensive task of protecting their own rights, leading people to join together to form
a protection association where each member would take his turn as watchman and the group
would decide how to deal with rights violators. Although superior to the each-man-for-
himself approach, the task of protection would remain unenviable for some, and in time,
individuals would create private protection firms that would provide these services for a fee.
Eventually, market competition would result in a single dominant protection agency (or a
cartel of firms), which would protect their clientele and adjudicate disputes through rules and
procedures agreed to by each client. The last move, which converts the dominant protection
agency into a bona fide minimal state, responds to those few independents who do not
contract for protection and instead enforce their rights outside of the system. The agency
cannot allow them to use force against clientele in the absence of its own determination that a
client has violated an independent's rights and should be required to pay a consequence (e.g.,
compensation and punishment), yet this leaves the independent unable to protect his own
rights or obtain a remedy. Such injustice can only be avoided by the dominant protection
agency providing its services to the independents, who can be charged (i.e., taxed) in kind.
24. A subtle point should be made here. Nozick at times refers to individuals
contracting with a protective agency/minimal state to protect their rights, but at other times he
describes individuals transferring their rights to these entities. NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra
note 4, at 89 (noting that "the legitimate powers of a protective association are merely the
sum of the individual rights that its members or clients transfer to the association"). Maybe
Nozick viewed an agreement with an agency/state to protect individual rights as synonymous
with a transfer of such rights. But cf Robert Paul Wolff, Robert Nozick's Derivation of the
Minimal State, 19 ARIz. L. REV. 7, 23-24 (1977) (critiquing the idea of simple rights transfer).
Although this might seem like mere semantics, an important issue is at stake: Libertarianism
may be most compatible with the view that only individuals have rights and the state has
none, at least intrinsically. For this reason, I will assume that individuals do not transfer their
rights but instead contract with a minimal state to protect their rights, which individuals still
maintain. A full exploration of this point is beyond the scope of this paper, however.
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how he deals with independent hold-outs) may prove too clever for
many.25 On this score, however, his theory is not uniquely flawed; the
social contractarians have major problems as well, such as the fictional
nature of party agreement. In fact, both approaches are in good
company, as all political theories will have some potential flaws duly
identified by career critics. But regardless of such wrangling,
libertarianism's conception of individual rights and limited government
offers a compelling image of society that challenges the prevalent
statism of American political discourse.
A libertarian minimal state-restricted to protecting a person's
rights against force and theft by others-is not only just but
inspirational,26 libertarians suggest, particularly given the alternative.
The more government acts, the more it adopts a distinct vision of the
good life. For some, this may entail socialist-style welfare; others may
seek Bible-beating religiosity; and still others may imagine hedonic
decadence. But a state that enshrines a particular notion of the good
necessarily impedes the pursuit of all others. In contrast, a minimal
state limited to protecting people's rights offers a model for pluralism,
where each individual is free to organize his life without interference in
order to achieve his own private utopia. Libertarianism thus provides "a
framework for utopias, a place where people are at liberty to join
together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own vision of
the good life in the ideal community but where no one can impose his
own utopian vision upon others."27 It is this unwavering opposition to
paternalism-grounded in the freedom to live one's life without
direction from an tiber-nanny-that is so appealing, even to those who
enjoy the amenities of the modern state.
III.
Needless to say, the foregoing offers only a broad brush sketch of
libertarianism, admittedly incomplete and subject to all sorts of caveats.
25. Among other things, some might suggest that Nozick's "invisible hand" account of
the origins of the minimal state is no different than the "social contract" theory employed by
both classical and contemporary philosophers (e.g., Locke and Rawls), with individuals
contracting with protection agencies on the way to creating a government. However, it could
be argued that only the invisible-hand mechanism ensures that no one's rights are violated in
the process of state formation, for instance, and that social contractarianism requires one to
stretch the metaphor "so that each pattern or state of affairs that arises from the disparate
voluntary actions of separately acting individuals is viewed as arising from a social compact."
NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 132.
26. Id. at ix.
27. Id. at 312.
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But it provides a sufficient backdrop for present purposes and, in
particular, for an inquiry into the libertarian implications for criminal
justice. Some are well known and have been suggested above or follow
directly from the theory's basic principles. The state would have no
authority to act without a violation of a person's rights of self-ownership
and private property, meaning that it could not prohibit what someone
does to himself and his possessions, nor could it ban voluntary
transactions among individuals. The notion of a "victimless crime"
would cease to exist, for example, with self-regarding acts and free-
market exchanges among adults-prostitution, gambling, the trade and
consumption of drugs and sexually explicit materials, and so on-all
being beyond official power. Instead, as Mill argued, "the only purpose
for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others,,
28
where that harm amounts to a violation of another's rights.
Additional aspects of criminal justice have been addressed from a
libertarian perspective, such as the procedural requirements for the state
to interfere with an individual's rights, from initial contact and
questioning of a citizen by government officials, to searches and seizures
of his person and possessions, to the process by which factual guilt is
determined. At each of these points, American libertarians tend to err
on the side of personal freedom-for instance, adamantly opposing new
or expanded exceptions to Fourth Amendment safeguards.29 What is far
less developed, however, are the ramifications that flow from a properly
investigated and established rights violation. If we assume that these
acts are officially proscribed ("crimes") and require some undesirable
state-imposed consequence ("punishment"), the question becomes the
justificatory means to the appropriate outcome. To date, libertarian
theory has no settled rationale for punishment and has been silent with
regard to the process of sentencing. As Murray Rothbard observed
three decades ago:
Few aspects of libertarian political theory are in less
satisfactory state than the theory of punishment.
Usually, libertarians have been content to assert or
develop the axiom that no one may aggress against the
person or property of another; what sanctions may be
28. MILL, supra note 5, at 14. It should be noted, however, that Mill allowed for the
possibility that public "offences against decency" might be prohibited. Id. at 108-09.
29. E.g., Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Atwater
v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (No. 99-1408), 2000 WL 1369442.
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taken against such an invader has been scarcely treated
at all.'
Although the ensuing years have not witnessed a libertarian accord
on punishment-akin to, say, the belief in self-ownership-there are
points of concurrence, such as the obligation of convicted criminals to
provide compensation for violating the rights of their victims. What this
entails, however, is not always clear. Some theorists, such as Nozick,
offer abstract terms for a compensatory regime-that a victim should be
placed in as good a position as he would have occupied but for the
violation of his rights-but not much more." Other commentators
agree with the general idea that a victim should be "made whole again,"
yet the exact formulations of how this would be achieved are often quite
different.
A thief must turn over the pilfered property, for sure, but it has been
suggested that the same harm now must be done to him in turn-"two
teeth for a tooth,"3 2 some libertarians say. So in addition to disgorging
the ill-gotten gain (the first "tooth"), the offender should forfeit his
rights to the same degree as he violated those of another (the second
"tooth"). For example, the larcenist would be required to return the
stolen goods and shell out the value of the booty from his own wealth,
with both "teeth" provided to the victim.33 Moreover, the criminal must
compensate the injured party for the fear and insecurity suffered as a
result of the rights violation, and he must reimburse law enforcement for
the costs of investigating the crime and apprehending the perpetrator.
4
30. ROTHBARD, supra note 4, at 85.
31. NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 57.
Something fully compensates a person for a loss if and only if it makes
him no worse off than he otherwise would have been; it compensates
person X for person Y's action A if X is no worse off receiving it, Y
having done A, than X would have been without receiving it if Y had not
done A. (In the terminology of economists, something compensates X for
Y's act if receiving it leaves X on at least as high an indifference curve as
he would have been on, without it, had Y not so acted.)
Id. Nozick also assumes that the victim will take "reasonable precautions and adjusting
activities." Id. at 58.
32. Roy Whitehead & Walter Block, Taking the Assets of Criminals to Compensate
Victims of Violence: A Legal and Philosophical Approach, 5 J.L. SoC'Y 229, 246 (2003); see
also ROTHBARD, supra note 4, at 88.
33. See ROTHBARD, supra note 4, at 88.
34. See id.; Whitehead & Block, supra note 32, at 246-47. In a sense, then, this theory
calls for more than "two teeth."
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Others reject this methodology, suggesting that the victim must be
reimbursed for the full value of his loss but not be overcompensated,
recognizing that wrongdoing does not indiscriminately extinguish the
offender's property rights, for instance, or out of concern for the rights
of the wrongfully convicted.35
Randy Barnett has developed a particularly ingenious libertarian-
based scheme that would provide victims an enforceable right to
compensation-if necessary, through the paid employment of confined
criminals. 36 He envisions this pure restitution system as a substitute for
punishment, rejecting both consequentialist objectives like deterrence
and non-consequentialist conceptions of retribution. Barnett does allow
for preventative detention for those who present a credible threat of
future rights violations, although he claims that this is based on an
extended version of self-defense rather than punishment. 7  But
whatever the label-punishment, defense of property rights, or maybe
some hybrid we could call "propertyment"-the result is the same,
incapacitation of the offender, a traditional objective of utilitarian
punishment. Barnett thus seems at odds with libertarians who eschew
consequentialist goals or view restitution as a necessary but insufficient
criterion of justice for rights violations.38
In contrast, theorists like Nozick and Rothbard endorse a retributive
approach based on the idea that offenders deserve to be punished. Both
approve of retribution as setting an upper limit on the amount of
punishment that can be inflicted, precluding sanctions that are
disproportionate to the harm caused to the victim. 39 But they disagree
on the appropriate rationale and the form punishment can take. For
Rothbard, the animating principle appears to be rights vindication
through retaliation-basically, a form of lex talionis-where the victim is
authorized to impose the precise rights violation upon the offender:
35. See, e.g., BARNETr, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 200-05; see also
ROBERT NoziCK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 382 (1981) [hereinafter NOzICK,
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS].
36. See BARNETT, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 176-84, 200-05,216-37; see
also Randy E. Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice, in ASSESSING THE
CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 349 (Randy E. Barnett
& John Hagel III eds., 1977) [hereinafter Barnett, Restitution].
37. See BARNETT, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 184-91,213-15.
38. Roger Pilon, Criminal Remedies: Restitution, Punishment, or Both?, 88 ETHICS 348
(1978); ROTHBARD, supra note 4, at 88-95; Whitehead & Block, supra note 32, at 243-45.
39. See ROTHBARD, supra note 4, at 89-91; NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 60-63;
NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 363-97.
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For example, suppose that A has severely beaten B; B
now has the right to beat up A as severely, or a bit more,
or to hire someone or some organization to do the
beating for him ....
The victim, then, has the right to exact punishment up
to the proportional amount as determined by the extent
of the crime .... '
Nozick eschews punishment for the purpose of retaliation, however,
making a point to distinguish between retribution and revenge."'
Instead, he conceives a retributive approach that seeks to reconnect the
offender with the correct values that have been violated, where
deserved punishment is a function of the wrongfulness of the act and a
person's responsibility for it.42  Under this ostensibly non-
consequentialist rationale, "the role of suffering in punishment is not
merely to ensure a significant effect in people's lives, but ... to negate
or lessen flouting by making it impossible to remain as pleased with
one's previous anti-linkage. 4 1 It is unclear what types of punishment
would be permissible under this philosophical framework. 44 But Nozick
is unambiguous that, following Locke's concededly curious doctrine,
everyone has a right to punish4 -and most relevant for present
40. ROTHBARD, supra note 4, at 88-89; see also Whitehead & Block, supra note 32, at
246-48.
41. See NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 366-70. To a
certain extent, Nozick's Philosophical Explanations fills a gap in Anarchy, State, and Utopia,
which admittedly "does not contain a precise statement and justification of a theory of
retributive punishment." NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at xiv. Some might suggest,
however, that Nozick had abandoned his libertarian position by the time he wrote
Philosophical Explanations. But cf James W. Harris, Renowned Philosopher Robert Nozick:
Still A Libertarian, 6 THE LIBERATOR ONLINE, Aug. 11, 2001, http://www.theadvocates.org/
liberator/vol-06-num-15.htm (quoting Nozick: "What I was really saying in [the 1989 book]
'The Examined Life' was that I was no longer as hardcore a libertarian as I had been before.
But the rumors of my deviation (or apostasy!) from libertarianism were much exaggerated.").
42. See NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 363-65, 374-90; see
also NOZtCK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 59-63.
43. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 384.
44. At times, Nozick speaks of "retributive matching penalties," which authorize the
imposition of the same wrong or harm on the offender, and he seems to accept (but not
necessarily advocate) capital punishment. See, e.g., NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 364, 371, 373, 378; see also NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note
4, at 60 n.*. At other times, he suggests that there are limits to retribution (as compared to
revenge) and "not every heinous act will be matched," NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 371 n.*; apparently anticipating that incarceration will
remain the primary form of punishment. Id. at 366-71, 388.
45. See NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 10, 137-42. But cf. David B. Lyons, Rights
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purposes, "punishment is not owed to the victim.., and so it is not
something he has special authority over. 4 6 Moreover, steps might have
to be taken to exclude victims from interfering with the process of
punishment, which otherwise would blur "the distinctness of retribution
from revenge.,
47
IV.
It is at this point that punishment theorists usually begin picking at
each others' approaches. Utilitarians will assail retribution as being
willfully blind to the causes of crime and the consequences of
punishment, for instance, and quixotic in its belief in a transcendental
conversion chart of harmful wrongdoing to deserved penalties. But
retributivists will note the equally whimsical nature of deterrence
calculations, as well as the apparent willingness of their consequentialist
rivals to punish the innocent if need be. Utilitarians may retort that
"just deserts" is mere pretense for a barbaric settling of scores, with
retributivists firing back that "rehabilitation" often serves as code for
brainwashing and coerced medical treatment. In turn, retributivists will
condemn selective incapacitation as immoral punishment for who
someone is rather than what he has done, while utilitarians will find it
just as immoral to sentence dangerous predators without concern for
future victims. 48 And on and on it goes.
As suggested above, libertarians are no different. Some promote
retribution, while others reject it. Those who spurn consequentialist
goals and, in particular, deterrence, still find room for incapacitation
under the guise of proactive self-defense. Prominent theorists who
accept the right to punish nonetheless disagree as to where that right
resides, with the victim or instead with society as a whole. And although
libertarians generally support compensation, few details have been
forthcoming beyond academic hypotheticals. The great irony, for me at
least, is that the condition of the debate-the inability to settle basic
issues of punishment and the indeterminacy or sometimes wooden
nature of scholarly examples-should have been a warning signal to
libertarians that the entire enterprise might be inconsistent with core
Against Humanity, 85 PHIL. REV. 208, 210 (1976) (critiquing this concept).
46. NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 138.
47. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 367.
48. See Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 205-27 (discussing punishment justifications and
criticisms).
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philosophical principles on which they do agree.
For a moment, let's pause to think about the idea that (1) there is a
single correct justification of punishment that (2) empowers the state to
impose undesirable consequences on offenders. As a matter of
experience, the first claim has not worn well. The battle among
punishment theorists is millennia old and shows no signs of resolution,
with leading minds of each generation taking diametrically opposed
positions-Becarria, Bentham, Hegel, and Kant in previous centuries, to
name a few, and a litany of respected scholars in modern times. Having
witnessed sometimes passionate debates among academic interlocutors
championing their own favored rationales-just deserts, deterrence,
communicative punishment, rehabilitation, and so on-it is hard not to
conclude that people in good conscience can and will have different
opinions about the purpose of the criminal sanction. 9  More
importantly, that is exactly what should be expected in a free society,
one consistent with libertarianism's dedication to pluralism of thought.
As for the second claim, an authentic minimal state need not, and
therefore would not, impose any particular justification of punishment,
implementing its own favored rationale over the will of affected parties.
A common value of all libertarian philosophy is the freedom of each
person to realize his own vision of the good life without interference
from other individuals or collectives like the state. And just as an
individual can be expected to have a plan on how to achieve his vision of
the good, he is likely to have an idea of what justice requires in response
49. In the words of Herbert Morris:
[W]hat surfaces in discussions of punishment is the unsettling fact that
among individuals apprised of all the relevant facts, apparently intractable
differences arise over what can and cannot serve as a justification. Some
theorists, for example, view desert as fundamental. Others remain
puzzled by the idea of people deserving a painful response and perplexed
as to how one could ever rationally impose pain on someone because of
what is past, rather than as a consequence of some good that is
contemplated to come in the future. This difference in philosophic
attitude, so persistent over time and so apparently resistant to
modification, suggests a possibility that Nietzsche would have found quite
plausible, namely that theoretical differences often are rooted in
temperamental differences, that people are more or less deontologically
or consequentially disposed. Whatever the explanation for this familiar
and unresolved dispute over punishment and its justification, it would be
unduly optimistic to predict anything like theoretical consensus.
Herbert Morris, Concluding Remarks: The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1927,
1930-31 (1999).
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to a rights violation that interferes with his pursuit of personal utopia.
To be told by the state that his justification of punishment is incorrect
(or correct, for that matter) is the precise type of paternalism that
libertarians should find insufferable. It is not that libertarianism
embodies extreme relativism, where there are no right answers to issues
like the rationale for punishment. Maybe there are such answers-and
surely a given individual may believe that his own justification is
superior to all others. Instead, libertarianism is committed to the notion
that the state should not take a stance on moral issues such as this.
Does it all necessarily devolve into punishment anarchy? I think
not, given libertarianism's conception of individual rights and a minimal
state, supplemented by a few modest assumptions. Imagine the
following hypothetical, which seems apropos given the site of this
symposium: Without provocation or consent, a baseball player
intentionally strikes someone with a bat during a Milwaukee Brewers
game. The offending athlete has violated the self-ownership rights of
another, who now may act in self-defense and/or vindicate his right to be
free from aggression. For instance, he might seek some jail time for the
offending ballplayer, ° based on the extent of the damage inflicted, or
instead, the victim might demand monetary compensation. The amount
of harm caused would be case specific and nearly impossible to ascertain
beforehand, and the appropriate response will depend on the
justification of punishment. In contrast to the views of personal injury
lawyers and dogged supporters of the federal sentencing guidelines,
50. A commentator asked me how libertarianism could authorize jail time for a criminal,
given its strong presumption against deprivations of liberty. But libertarianism should not be
confused with pacifism:
Libertarians see themselves as defenders of rights; [and] the difference
between rights and other sorts of moral claims lies in the fact that rights
are legitimately enforceable....
... [W]hat makes a moral claim a right rather than something else is
precisely the fact that coercion may be used to enforce it. Whoever
endorses radical pacifism, then, is committed to denying that anyone has
any rights-a rather odd position for a libertarian to be in!
Roderick T. Long, Punishment vs. Restitution, FORMULATIONS, Winter 1993-1994
(emphasis omitted), available at http://www.libertariannation.org/a/fl2l2.html. In
turn, there is no reason why libertarianism would eschew incarceration as a form of
rights enforcement. See, e.g., BARNETT, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY, supra note 7, at
184-93, 213-15; Pilon, supra note 38, at 355-56 (arguing that a crime "involved a
violation of the victim's dignity; the criminal intentionally used the victim for his
own ends, and against the victim's will," and "[i]n so doing, the criminal alienated
his own right against being similarly treated by the victim," "thus creat[ing] a right
in the victim (or his surrogate) to use the criminal as he himself was used").
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there is no precise moral calculus for every victim that converts crimes
into financial restitution or incarcerative sentences.'
No one can assess in the abstract the physical and psychological
damage from a rights violation. Consider the issue of compensation in
the case of the battering ballplayer. Maybe the victim was a strapping
young person who received only a bruise and is happy to be
compensated with an autographed bat, possibly the offending weapon,
as some type of memento. But maybe the casualty was a frail
octogenarian who suffered a serious concussion, followed by horrible
nightmares and the fearful life of a shut-in, all as a result of the incident.
I'm not sure what amount of monetary restitution, if any, would
compensate the latter victim, but I do know that the person who knows
best, and should be intimately involved in that decision, is the injured
party himself, the very person whose rights were violated. Moreover, a
non-paternalistic state would not tell the victim that the appropriate
stance is pure restitution and that his rights cannot be vindicated
pursuant to retribution, deterrence, or whatever happens to be his own
justification of punishment.
As such, a libertarian approach would not be compensation-or-bust,
nor would it be all-desert-all-the-time. Although premised on a real fact
pattern,52 the above example is just as stilted as any other scholarly
hypothetical and offered for the usual reason: to try to incite a particular
reaction in the audience, in this case, an intuition among many that the
appropriate punishment will be context sensitive. Compensation might
do, but with a change of facts, incarceration might be appropriate
pursuant to consequentialist or non-consequentialist goals. But now
consider a brutal kidnapping and rape. My suspicion is that most
Americans, imagining the type of response they would demand were
they the victim, would find a pure restitutionary scheme to be repulsive
for allowing the offender to buy his way out of justified punishment.13 I
51. Cf Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25 (2005).
52. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Pilon, supra note 38, at 351.
If a rich man rapes a rich woman, are we really to suppose that monetary
damages will restore the status quo, will satisfy the claims of justice? A
wealthy child molester will treat compensation simply as the price of
pleasure! And what of the terrorist who murders, knowing that his
wealthy backer will settle the account? The reduction of criminal wrongs
to civil wrongs, in short, or at least the addressing of criminal wrongs with
civil remedies, bespeaks an all too primitive view of what in fact is at issue
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know that my own retributive instincts, curbed only by the
contemporary limits of sanctioning (e.g., no torture), would lean toward
an extremely long sentence, maybe even life imprisonment. But what if
the actual victim is a prison abolitionist who only wants compensation
for her medical bills: Who am I to say that her reasoning is wrong and
the violation of her rights must be vindicated pursuant to my rationale?'
Once again, this hypothetical is staged with an objective: to arouse
the natural response of many, that harsh punishment is called for, as
well as the modern recognition that crimes like rape are extremely
personal, implicating a severe violation of an individual's right to bodily
integrity or, in libertarian terms, self-ownership. With such crimes,
there is a well-based understanding that no one is entitled to tell the
victim how she should feel, that she must forgive the offender or,
conversely, hold vengeance in her heart. There is a tendency to
personalize or even take ownership of the crime-for victims to refer to
"my rape"-in a way that might sound strange if applied to different
crimes (e.g., "my theft"). But what is true of the horrific rights violation
of rape also applies to any other offense in a minimal state. It is not "a
breach of the King's peace," but the violation of an individual's rights.
And that is why libertarianism should find it illegitimate for the state to
impose its justification of punishment in opposition to the views of the
victim and other affected individuals. The state has no rights itself and
can only act to vindicate the rights of individuals.
Does this mean that the victim may demand any sanction, or none at
all, applying his own justification of punishment to the rights violation at
hand? That doesn't seem correct-the offender has rights, too, which
have been forfeited only to the extent of his crime. He will have his own
personal vision of justice, something that would inform a punishment
rationale, and he surely has a vested interest in avoiding an excessive,
rights-extinguishing sanction. And although not as direct or compelling
as those of the victim and offender, the rights of others may be at stake
in the resolution of a criminal episode. The commission of a crime may
place third parties in fear for their lives and property, impeding full
in the matter of crime.
Id; cf Dan M. Kahan, Punishment Incommensurability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691 (1998).
54. See, e.g., Wallet Cards: A Way to Say No to the Death Penalty, WASH. POST, Nov. 29,
1998, at A24 (discussing wallet cards carried by capital punishment opponents that say, "If
I'm ever murdered, I want my killer punished-but not executed," and suggesting the
immorality of imposing the death penalty over the victim's wishes); see also Pilon, supra note
38, at 356-57.
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enjoyment of such rights and fulfillment of their visions of the good life.
It is this fear of future rights violations, either by the offender or others
emboldened by the crime, that libertarian theorists like Barnett and
Nozick offer as the reason for incarceration qua extended self-defense
(for the former) or preventative restraint (for the latter).5 "Others too
are affected" by crime, Nozick argues, "they are made fearful and less
secure if such crimes go unpunished.",
6
The problem is how to reach a just resolution given the potentially
conflicting views of the victim, the offender, and other interested
individuals, which is where a libertarian government may have a role.
Might makes right in the theoretical state of nature, and disputes are
resolved by private force, leading to undue punishment or, conversely,
no sanction at all. Whether by social compact or Nozickian invisible-
hand, a minimal state arises to replace the private feud by protecting
and vindicating the rights of individuals. It might establish a fair process
by which conflicting rights and punishment rationales-those of victims,
offenders, and affected third parties-can be mediated toward a
reasonable outcome. The state might even appoint an agent to
represent these individuals if they were to choose not to participate in
the process, or if the affected third parties were too diffuse or large in
number. A victim may desire limited involvement in the criminal
process or none at all, for example, and the residents of an entire
neighborhood might be fear-struck by a particular crime. And should
the mediation fail to resolve the matter, a neutral decision maker might
be called upon to reach an appropriate punishment given the views of
the interested parties.
But what a true libertarian state would not do is preclude the victim
from participating in this process or dismiss entirely his opinion on
punishment in favor of its own. The brutality of enforcement in the
state of nature inspires the creation of government to end private
55. See BARNETT, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 184-91; NOZICK,
ANARCHY, supra note 4 at 65-71, 142-46. Barnett would require substantive and procedural
limitations on extended self-defense (e.g., only allowed against those who have committed
prior criminal behavior), BARNETF, STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY, supra note 7, at 213-14, while
Nozick hypothesizes that preventative restraint would require compensation for those
detained, which might only be possible "by setting aside a pleasant area for such persons"
that is "luxurious enough to compensate someone for the disadvantages of being prohibited
from living among others in the wider society." NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 143,
144.
56. NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 139; see also Daniel M. Farrell, Punishment
Without the State, 22 NoOS 437, 443-50 (1988); Margaret R. Holmgren, Punishment as
Restitution: The Rights of the Community, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1983, at 36, 40.
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feuding, but this hardly requires individuals to forego involvement in
determinations about their rights or to empower the state to impose a
justification of punishment irrespective of the opinions of those whose
rights are in the balance. On the contrary, individuals would seem to
have a type of property interest in the resolution of their rights (as will
be discussed below), and there is no obvious reason why people would
either want to or have to surrender this interest. 7 And in contrast to
Nozick, "the fact that the victim was the one most affected by the crime"
does "give him a special status with regard to punishing the offender[.]"5"
After all, it is the victim's rights that have been violated and require
vindication, not any right intrinsic in the state. As mentioned, a
government official may act as an agent of the victim, if he so chooses,
and maybe an official could represent a wide class of people whose
rights have been put in jeopardy by future predations. But in Nozick's
words, "the state need not be so egomaniacal as to claim the sole right
to decide moral questions,"5 9 including, I believe, those involving
punishment.
V.
The practical consequences of a libertarian theory of punishment
could be far-reaching, and the full implications are not at all clear to me
at this point. But I want to try to bring this to bear on a pair of
symposium topics, beginning with plea bargaining. Broadly defined, a
57. Nozick apparently assumes that almost all activities related to the vindication of
rights violations must be conducted by the state. See, e.g., NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4,
at 118-19. It might be conceded that government has to maintain a monopoly on the use of
force (except as needed for immediate self-defense), as well as the sole authority to determine
issues of factual guilt-those things that must be conducted by the state alone to prevent
private feuding and vigilantism, and to ensure that only the factually guilty are held to
account. But what does not necessarily follow is that affected individuals must forego
participation in the process of determining punishment: Fact-finding in criminal cases and
enforcement of a given sanction are distinct and separable from the determination of an
appropriate punishment. A convincing reason to exclude victims from the latter is not readily
evident to me (because retaliatory violence is already precluded), nor is there one to explain
why victims would necessarily abstain from involvement. Moreover, a full state monopoly on
the decision-making process of punishment only seems plausible if victims "transfer" to the
state all rights stemming from a violation of their rights, a claim that might result in the
arguably non-libertarian notion of "state's rights." See supra note 24. Once again, however,
an investigation of this issue is beyond the scope of the present work.
58. NOZICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 139 (asking rhetorical question); see, e.g.,
Barnett, Restitution, supra note 36, at 363 ("The armed robber did not rob society; he robbed
the victim. His debt, therefore, is not to society; it is to the victim."); Pilon, supra note 38, at
349, 353-57.
59. NOzICK, ANARCHY, supra note 4, at 24.
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plea bargain involves a defendant agreeing to waive his trial rights in
exchange for the government's assent to his pleading guilty to lesser
crimes and/or receiving lower punishment than otherwise possible.
Nationally, more than ninety percent of all convictions are obtained by
plea bargain,' with some suggesting that the process is a necessary evil
given America's enormous criminal docket and others describing it as
the product of a law enforcement obsession with victory, backed by the
weaponry to achieve it.6' As detailed in a voluminous literature,62 there
are more problems with plea bargaining than you can shake a stick at, so
to speak, many of which should trouble a libertarian. 3 But there is one
issue that may be of special concern: the lack of meaningful
participation and agreement of those whose rights are implicated.
As mentioned at the beginning, apologists for plea bargaining
typically rationalize the practice as a voluntary exchange between
willing parties, often using a line of reasoning that rings of
libertarianism. For example, Frank Easterbrook has described plea
bargaining as part of a well-functioning market system not unlike
commodities transactions in a free market.64  Defendants simply
exchange something they possess-various constitutional rights-for
something they place a higher value on-receiving a lower punishment,
60. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS fig.C (2006) available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2005/fig-c-post.pdf;
Matthew R. Durose & Patrick A. Langan, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2004 1 (2007).
61. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ("If every criminal charge
were subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to
multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities."); United States v. Green,
346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (D. Mass. 2004) (describing the U.S. Department of Justice as
"addicted to plea bargaining to leverage its law enforcement resources to an overwhelming
conviction rate"); William Glaberson, Result of Military Trial Is Familiar to Civilians, N.Y.
TIMES, March 28, 2007, at A17 (describing a plea bargain as "the rubber-meets-the-road
moment that makes it possible for courts all over America to cope with caseloads that would
choke them if every defendant insisted on a trial").
62. Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983); Stephanos Bibas,
Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004); Stephen J.
Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992); Michael O'Hear, Plea
Bargaining and Procedural Justice 42 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
63. For a libertarian critique of plea bargaining on constitutional grounds, see Timothy
Lynch, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, REGULATION, Fall 2003, at 24, available at
www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv26n3/v26n3-7.pdf.
64. See Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J.
1909 (1992). See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12
J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure]; Easterbrook, Plea
Bargaining as Compromise, supra note 2.
2007]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
avoiding trial-related costs (financial and psychological), resolving the
case as quickly as possible, et cetera. Prosecutors also gain from plea
bargaining, mostly by expending fewer resources to attain more
convictions and a higher conviction rate. Everyone is better off as a
result, or so it is argued, with market forces setting the price of crime
through negotiated settlement between accuser and accused. "Why
should we interfere with compromises of litigation?," Easterbrook asks.
"If the accused is entitled to a trial at which all his rights are honored
and the sentence is appropriate to the crime, yet prefers compromise,
who are we to disagree?"65 And given that this market process can only
succeed if prosecutors and defendants have considerable autonomy to
contract, there appears to be little reason to allow other parties to hold
sway in the process.66
Some scholars have described this capitalistic vision as "chilling,"
condemning the idea that individual rights and criminal sanctions can be
haggled over in "a glorious Turkish rug market.' '67  Of course,
libertarianism is the philosophical patron of free-market transactions
and could hardly object to the abstract notion of voluntary exchange in
criminal justice. Instead, a libertarian approach to punishment might
find disconcerting several other aspects of plea bargaining in action.
Two scholars who supported plea bargaining (with qualifications) under
contract theory, Robert Scott and William Stuntz, nonetheless described
the process as "scandalously casual," with most agreements reached
through
a quick conversation in a prosecutor's office or a
courthouse hallway between attorneys familiar with only
the basics of the case, with no witnesses present, leading
to a proposed resolution that is then "sold" to both the
defendant and the judge. To a large extent, this kind of
horse trading determines who goes to jail and for how
long.68
The sometimes cavalier nature of plea bargaining is worrisome in
and of itself, but it also raises the likelihood of substantial agency costs
for the rights-bearing principals. At the outset, there will be issues of
65. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, supra note 2, at 1976.
66. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 64, at 298.
67. John H. Langbein, On the Myth of Written Constitutions: The Disappearance of
Criminal Jury Trial, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 119, 125-26 (1992).
68. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 64, at 1911-12.
[91:263
LIBERTARIAN THEORY OF PUNISHMENT
competence, whether a given attorney has the ability to serve his client's
welfare or instead will be out-lawyered by opposing counsel. But even
assuming a minimal level of professional aptitude, conflicts of interest
appear endemic in the practice of plea bargaining. Defense counsel
often has strong incentives to enter into plea negotiations and convince
his clients to take a deal; for instance, counsel may be paid the same
regardless of whether a case is pled out or goes to trial, although the
latter will require time and effort that could be spent on other matters.
Agency costs also exist with state attorneys, who may be enticed to plea
bargain in order to maximize the number of prosecutions, obtain a high
conviction rate, avoid embarrassing acquittals, maintain relationships
with the defense bar, and so on, all with the goal of advancing one's
career. None of this necessarily serves the interests of the government's
clients. 69
But who are these clients? A prosecutor represents some large body
politic defined by territorial boundaries-a city, county, state, or even
the entire nation-ostensibly serving some vague concept such as "the
public interest" or "the common good." Under a libertarian theory,
however, these political entities would only be empowered to vindicate
the individual rights that government has been enlisted to protect. As
deserves repeating, a minimal state has no rights itself, only a delimited
power to enforce the rights of individuals; moreover, libertarianism
rejects the notion of "collective rights," that new liberties can arise by
the creation of communal entities. A right inheres in the individual,
who may exercise or assign it to others, but no right springs forward by
the founding of officialdom. Schmaltzy terms like the "public interest"
have little value in a minimal state, but their infinite malleability does
provide cover for actions that may or may not be justified as enforcing
the rights of individuals as compared to promoting the personal interests
of a government official.
Conceivably, prosecutors might represent those whose rights were
actually violated, the direct victims of crime (and, to a lesser extent,
people who were placed in fear by the wrongdoing), pursuant to a
delegation of authority to vindicate their individual rights. But that
certainly is not the official position today. If I were to commit a crime at
this symposium, maybe punching a fellow panelist, a prosecutor might
bring a criminal case on behalf of the State of Wisconsin (or maybe the
69. For a discussion of, inter alia, the impact of prosecutorial preferences on plea
bargaining and punishment, see William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's
Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004).
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County or City of Milwaukee), or if the panelist happened to be a
federal official,7 ° the case could be instituted for the United States of
America. The prosecutor would not represent the actual victim of my
crime, however, the individual whose rights were violated. And
although the assaulted panelist might bring a tort suit against me, he
would be limited to compensation regardless of his personal justification
of punishment, such as a belief that retribution or incapacitation was
required in the form of imprisonment.' In turn, supporters of plea
bargaining often suggest that the practice achieves optimal deterrence,72
which might be true and fully justified in my case, yet this utilitarian
objective may not be shared by those whose rights are implicated.
A libertarian critique of plea bargaining, then, might view the
prosecutor as impermissibly trading in other people's rights without
their consent. "The entire structure of the criminal justice system
presupposes that the relevant entitlements belong, in the meaningful
sense of that term, to the defendant and prosecutor," an assumption that
may not be sustainable if the foregoing is correct, at least without an
alteration in the supposedly "bedrock rules" of plea bargaining.73 To be
sure, many victims and other interested parties might desire to have
government attorneys as their agents in a criminal prosecution, or they
may prefer to avoid involvement altogether, and the ultimate outcome
may square with their own theories of justice. Moreover, I would
venture to guess that most prosecutors are conscientious of victims'
opinions and seek their input in the process. Some states even require
this by statute or constitutional provision, with precedents holding that
"the rights provided to crime victims.., cannot be plea bargained away
without the crime victim's actual approval."74 But the overlap between
the goals of criminal attorneys and those whose rights are at issue is not
inevitable, nor is the meaningful involvement of the rights-bearing
principals. In many cases, victims can be marginalized or wholly ignored
70. The federal official would need to have been assaulted "while engaged in or on
account of the performance of official duties." 18 U.S.C. § 111 (2000).
71. In some jurisdictions, the victim might also be able to recover punitive damages,
which "may properly be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition." BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 568 (1996). But successful civil suits do not carry the possibility of incarceration or
the ignominy of a criminal conviction.
72. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 64, at 304-05.
73. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 64, at 1917.
74. Wilson v. Commonwealth, 839 S.W.2d 17, 21 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992); see DOUGLAS E.
BELOOF ET AL., VICTIMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 476-97, 724-33 (2d ed. 2006).
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in the process and their dispositional opinions can be rejected.75
Plea bargaining, like almost all aspects of American criminal justice,
is dominated by the system's repeat players. Although criticism of this
reality from a libertarian perspective may be somewhat novel, the
critique itself has been around for quite a while. Three decades ago,
criminologist Nils Christie wrote a fascinating essay where he suggested
that conflicts were a form of property that had been stolen by
professionals, especially lawyers.7 6  In the modern criminal justice
system, the real parties are either overrepresented or marginalized.
Although his rights are at stake, an offender's role in his own case can
be quite limited due in large part to the complexity of the criminal
process and a paternalistic (but usually correct) belief that trained
advocates know best, with the defendant's in-court participation often
no more than a few scripted words (e.g., "not guilty, your honor") and
any greater involvement regarded as perilous. The victim's involvement
is even less, having been
pushed completely out of the arena, reduced to the
triggerer-off of the whole thing. She or he is a sort of
double loser; first, vis-ii-vis the offender, but secondly
and often in a more crippling manner by being denied
rights to full participation in what might have been one
of the more important ritual encounters in life. The
victim has lost the case to the state."
Although Christie's full argument is not libertarian, the idea that the
75. See Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States
Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 717-18 (2006).
[T]he inability of crime victims to mount private prosecutions or to
compel public prosecution reinforces the charging discretion and
bargaining power of prosecutors-as does the relatively limited ability of
crime victims to influence the terms of plea agreements. There is little
outside check on the benefits prosecutors may exchange for a guilty plea.
Id. (citation omitted); see, e.g., State v. Casey, 44 P.3d 756, 757-58 (Utah 2002) (describing
case where prosecutor changed plea deal without consulting victim); Tom Jackman,
Prosecutor Who Was Criticized for Rape Case Deal Resigns, WASH. POST, May 3, 2007, at B1
(similar); see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN
CRIMINAL TRIALS 247-48 (1995); Judith Rowland, Illusions of Justice: Who Represents the
Victim?, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 177 (1992); Sarah N. Welling, Victim Participation
in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301 (1987).
76. Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1977).
77. Id. at 3; see also id. at 7-9.
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real parties in a criminal episode have a property interest in the
conflict-not just in achieving a particular outcome but also in
participating in the process-is consistent with libertarianism's
commitment to rights held by discrete individuals, who should have a
say in how those rights are to be enforced or extinguished. When
prosecutors and defense attorneys plea bargain about punishment, they
are negotiating over the disposition of other people's property, the
rights of victims and offenders.
VI.
As suggested in the introduction, some might find it peculiar that a
libertarian theory would be critical of supposed agents using other
people's property,78 given that agency is central to modern free-market
systems, where individuals entrust skilled representatives to manage
their assets. But there are limits to the analogy between laissez faire
capitalism and plea bargaining. To begin with, libertarianism (and any
decent theory of contract) does not allow one to trade in another's
property if he does not have an agency relationship with the owner. As
argued above, crime victims need not (and do not) delegate all of their
rights to government, eliminating them as parties in the criminal process
and without any say as to the justification of punishment upon which to
vindicate their rights. A given victim might choose to do so, but this is
not an obligatory component of a minimal state.
Defendants, on the other hand, are parties to the dispute and might
be presumed to be voluntarily represented and capable of arms-length
bargaining. But the free-market comparison still doesn't quite work;
this is not a case of selling widgets (insert your favorite commodity),
where an individual can freely exit the widget business, can shop for
potential buyers of his widgets, and, in most cases, has a variety of
options when choosing an agent to represent him in widget-related
transactions. A criminal defendant has no choice but to participate in
the criminal process, and he cannot shop around for a different
78. Ironically, this type of claim was made by big-government progressives against
laissez faire economics, exemplified by President Franklin Roosevelt's claim that a small
group of capitalists "had concentrated into their own hands an almost complete control over
other people's property, other people's money, other people's labor-other people's lives."
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance of the Renomination for the Presidency (June 27, 1936),
in 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 230, 233 (Samuel
I. Rosenman ed., 1938); see also LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW
THE BANKERS USE IT (1914).
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prosecutor.79 Once an individual has been accused of a crime, he must
either negotiate with the state attorney, who holds a monopoly on the
charging and bargaining power, or instead take his chances at trial.
Moreover, substantial agency costs may be imposed on criminal
defendants whose attorneys have incentives to bargain rather than try
cases in the face of overwhelming dockets and paltry remuneration.
Oddly, Judge Easterbrook recognized the "scandalous" nature of some
payment scales for appointed counsel, " and yet pooh-poohed the
deficient representation that might result. "Agency costs are endemic"
in many contexts, he notes, and "[c]ritics of plea bargaining commit the
Nirvana Fallacy, comparing an imperfect reality to a perfection
achievable only in imaginary systems." 8'
An immaculate criminal justice system is too much to expect, for
sure, but one wonders whether proponents of plea bargaining might
suffer from their own cognitive limitation-a status quo bias, possibly
coupled with a lack of imagination, that makes the current situation
seem preferable to any other alternative.82 The existing system may be
optimal for some, particularly the professionals involved in the criminal
justice system. But if you accept the preceding theory of libertarianism,
as well as the concerns it has with a state-dominated criminal process
and the practice of plea bargaining, then the present situation is deeply
flawed. The government chooses both the justification of punishment
and the sanction imposed in criminal cases; the real rights-holders and
their views can be marginalized or even excluded in the process; and
professionals are allowed to trade in other people's rights. Although
this is not a pretty picture, Easterbrook's admonition should not go
unheeded: Is there a feasible approach that acknowledges the rights of
the individual and the pursuit of his own utopia that doesn't commit the
Nirvana Fallacy?
In my final few pages, I would like to suggest that a process might
exist with the potential to contribute at least a small part in an
unfinished libertarian project. It also happens to be a topic of this
symposium: "restorative justice." Broadly defined, it is an approach to
punishment that includes all stakeholders in a particular crime in a
group decision-making process to reach a mutually agreeable
79. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining, supra note 2, at 1975.
80. Id. at 1973-74.
81. Jd. at 1975-76.
82. Cf. Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL
L. REV. 608, 625-30 (1998).
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resolution.83 Advocates suggest that restorative justice has historical
origins and draws upon the punishment practices of non-Western
cultures, which view harmful wrongdoing as a breach of social
relationships that calls for the involvement of the affected parties in
resolving the dispute. From this perspective, a crime is first and
foremost an act against specific victims, whose rights were violated, and
the surrounding community, whose members may feel less secure in the
exercise of their rights. Likewise, the offender will now face an
undesirable consequence for his actions, a diminution of his liberty
through punishment. In a restorative justice program, each of these
individuals can be directly involved in the sanctioning process, possibly
with the assistance of supporters like family and friends, to express their
views and contribute to an appropriate outcome.
Over the past quarter century, various restorative practices have
emerged in Western nations, including the United States, that arguably
comport with this understanding. One particularly popular scheme,
"victim-offender mediation," involves victims and offenders voluntarily
brought together in a secure environment to discuss the crime and
possible resolution, with the process facilitated by a trained mediator.
4
Today, hundreds of victim-mediation programs exist throughout the
U.S., Canada, and Europe. 8  Another practice, often termed "family
group conferencing," also uses facilitated dialogue and collective
decision making, expanding the group of participants to include, inter
alia, victims, offenders, family members and other supporters, and law
enforcement representatives. A coordinator will prepare for a
conference by consulting with the stakeholders to determine a suitable
time and place to hold the event and to provide all information
necessary for their voluntary participation. Although the conference
itself may be structured to the needs of the attending stakeholders, it
typically begins with introductions and an explanation of the procedure,
followed by a factual summary of the offense and comments on its
83. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic
Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1, 5 (1999). For recent law review symposia on restorative
justice, see Symposium, Restorative Justice in Action, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 247 (2005); Fall 2003
Dispute Resolution Institute Symposium: Intentional Conversations About Restorative Justice,
Mediation and the Practice of Law, 25 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 235 (2004); The Utah
Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1.
84. Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, A Comparison of Four Restorative
Conferencing Models, JUV. JUST. BULL., Feb. 2001, at 2-3, 7-12; see also MARK S. UMBREIT
WITH ROBERT B. COATES & BORIS KALANJ, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION (1994).
85. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 84, at 2.
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accuracy. The victim, offender, and other stakeholders are then
provided an opportunity to express their opinions about the crime and
possible resolutions, leading to an open discussion and negotiation
aimed at producing an outcome agreed to by the participants.8
To be clear, restorative justice programs like family group
conferencing and victim-offender mediation do have conceptual
limitations. These sanctioning processes presume an offender's factual
and legal responsibility for the underlying offense; restorative justice
simply lacks the capacity to determine questions of guilt as is expected
of standard criminal trials. Moreover, participation of the core
participants-victims and offenders-must be of their own volition. If
they prefer not to be involved or a mutually agreeable resolution cannot
be reached, an alternative process must exist to adjudicate a criminal
sanction. A defendant's refusal to participate cannot mean that a
victim's rights will go without vindication, for instance, while the direct
victim's repudiation of his interests in punishment may have no bearing
on the rights of other individuals, such as those who now live in fear
because of the offender's wrongdoing. A victim of residential arson
who disclaims his interests against a pyromaniac, for example, does not
thereby divest the rights of neighbors who are justifiably panicked that
their homes will be next. In these situations, the standard criminal
process may come into play.
There are also considerations of programmatic experience. In many
places, restorative justice initiatives have been limited to relatively low-
level property offenses and crimes committed by juveniles. The
programs also tend to be employed as a type of diversion away from
formal prosecution or, in some situations, as a condition of probation
after an accepted guilty plea, and rarely is incarceration among the
possible sanctions that stakeholders may agree upon. But these confines
have been a matter of pragmatic implementation rather than theoretical
boundaries. There is no reason why restorative justice should be limited
to juvenile property crimes, for instance, or that terms of imprisonment
could not be included as possible outcomes. In fact, if restorative justice
is to be anything other than a fringe component in modern sentencing, it
must be open to adult offenders, the most serious crimes, and
incarcerative penalties, which remain at the forefront of any discussion
86. See, e.g., Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 84, at 5-6, 7-12; Luna, supra note 48, at
295-301; GABRIELLE M. MAXWELL & ALLISON MORRIS, FAMILY, VICTIMS AND CULTURE:
YOUTH JUSTICE IN NEW ZEALAND (1993); Joy Wundersitz & Sue Hetzel, Family
Conferencing for Young Offenders: The South Australian Experience, in FAMILY GROUP
CONFERENCES: PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY & PRACTICE 111 (Joe Hudson et al. eds., 1996).
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about American criminal justice."
For the libertarian theory of punishment sketched above, however,
the most important obstacle may come from restorative justice
advocates themselves. Most view restorative justice as implementing a
particular vision of crime and punishment. For example, some see it as
fulfilling a Biblical notion of criminal justice, whether it be a Mosaic
method of an "eye for an eye" or instead a New Testament-style
forgiveness and turning of the other cheek.' Others describe restorative
justice as conforming to the decision- and peace-making practices of
indigenous cultures, from the Maori of New Zealand to the Navajo of
North America. 9 Still others view it as a set of secular practices
87. A commentator questioned the notion that restorative justice would be open to
incarceration, asking, "What does incarceration restore?" A few responses come to mind.
First, and least convincing, some restorative justice advocates allow for the potential of
incarceration. See Erik Luna & Barton Poulson, Restorative Justice in Federal Sentencing: An
Unexpected Benefit of Booker?, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 787, 816 n.116 (2006). Second, it is
possible that incarceration may be necessary to "compensate" those affected by crime.
Suppose that the offender is incapable of providing monetary restitution to the victim or that
the crime is financially incommensurable:
What then? Obviously one likely outcome is frustration on the part of the
victim. And one standard source of relief for such is to lash out at its
causes, in this case the malefactor. If A can't have the life he'd like to
have had, one of the preferred ones in between the life he now faces-if
any-and his preferred original one free of B's intervention, might well be
one in which B suffers. In this special (?) case, the suffering of another,
which is ordinarily not a legitimate object of pursuit, becomes so as part of
a compensation package.... Given that B may properly be forced to do
whatever is necessary to achieve restitution up to the correct level then
this may be part of it.
Jan Narveson, Moving from Punishment to Compensation, 5 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 57,
66-67 (1992). Moreover, incarceration may be the only way to (partially) restore the sense of
security undermined by the crime. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. Finally, the
procedural conception of restorative justice suggested below does not necessarily advance the
principles of substantive restorative justice (e.g., "healing, not hurting"). Instead, it provides
a process whereby all legitimate justifications of punishment may be heard and all legitimate
sanctions may be imposed. As such, it might be appropriate to replace "restorative justice"
with a term that does not necessarily connote a particular substantive theory or set of
outcomes. Relabeling will have to await another day, however.
88. See, e.g., CHARLES W. COLSON, JUSTICE THAT RESTORES 130-37 (2000); JIM
CONSEDINE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: HEALING THE EFFECTS OF CRIME 147-56 (1995);
CHRISTOPHER D. MARSHALL, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: A NEW TESTAMENT VISION FOR
JUSTICE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT 131-43 (2001); HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A
NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE 177-214 (1990); THE SPIRITUAL ROOTS OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE (Michael L. Hadley ed., 2001).
89. MAXWELL & MORRIS, supra note 86; Janelle Smith, Peacemaking Circles: The
"Original" Dispute Resolution of Aboriginal People Emerges as the "New" Alternative Dispute
Resolution Process, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 329 (2003); Juan Tauri & Allison Morris,
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oriented toward restitution, for instance, or having various psychological
benefits for participants and a greater impact on consequential goals like
deterrence. 9 Of particular note are the works of John Braithwaite, who
has developed both positive and normative theories of restorative
justice. The former is based on his analysis of "reintegrative shaming,"
with restorative justice reducing crime by effectively shaming offenders
and then reintegrating them into law-abiding society.9 The latter is
premised on a republican theory of criminal justice (developed with
philosopher Philip Pettit), which provides an argument for restorative
justice as maximizing "dominion," understood as a social and relational
model of liberty.92
An entirely different conception of restorative justice, however,
would not embody a particular justification of punishment. Instead, it
would view restorative justice as providing a procedural approach that
does not take a stand on the merits of utilitarianism, retributivism,
republicanism, communicative and compensatory models, et cetera.
Each punishment rationale is sure to have certain virtues for its sponsors
and vices for its detractors, and as mentioned earlier, people in good
conscience can and will adopt their own visions of justice in sentencing.
Some will be more deontologically disposed, others will have
consequentialist perspective, and there is no reason to believe that those
most directly affected by a given crime and subsequent sanction would
Re-forming Justice: The Potential of Maori Processes, 30 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 149
(1997); Robert Yazzie, "Hozho Nahasdlii"-We Are Now in Good Relations: Navajo
Restorative Justice, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 117 (1996); Robert Yazzie & James W. Zion,
Navajo Restorative Justice: The Law of Equality and Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 157 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996); JOHN
BELGRAVE, NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A DISCUSSION
PAPER § 5.4 (1996), available at http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/1996/restorative/
chapter5.html.
90. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L.
BULL. 244 (2002); Luna & Poulson, supra note 87, at 799-807; Barton Poulson, A Third
Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice,
2003 UTAH L. REV. 167; Thomas J. Scheff, Community Conferences: Shame and Anger in
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 67 REVISTA JURIDICA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO RICO 97
(1998); cf William R. Nugent et al., Participation in Victim-Offender Mediation and the
Prevalence and Severity of Subsequent Delinquent Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 137.
91. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 54-68 (1989).
92. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN
THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 91-92 (1990). One commentator asked me whether a
libertarian could endorse a theory of maximizing dominion, to which I responded "sure," so
long as the state does not itself endorse and attempt to impose this theory (or any other) on
individuals whose rights were implicated by a given crime and punishment.
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subscribe to identical punishment rationales or apply them in the same
way. What does seem feasible is that a dialogic process might lead these
individuals to agree on a particular resolution without necessarily
agreeing on its justification. By bringing together victims, offenders,
their supporters, and various stakeholders, and then providing them an
opportunity to express their opinions in an undominated forum,
restorative justice offers a broad framework for parties to find common
ground on outcomes while maintaining their own subjective
interpretations of justice. In this way, those affected by crime may be
able to achieve a resolution that represents a type of "overlapping
consensus" of all parties, each individual coming to a particular
resolution through a process of reflection on moral intuitions and
judgments. 3
This procedural conception of restorative justice thus seems
consistent with a libertarian theory of punishment: Those whose rights
are infringed by the crime (e.g., victims) or the punishment (offenders)
are afforded the opportunity to participate in (or abstain from) a system
of rights vindication or forfeiture. Officials may facilitate this process,
institute procedural boundaries for peaceful resolution, and provide an
enforcement mechanism. The state may also establish a default
decision-making structure-most likely, the traditional criminal justice
system-should party agreement prove impossible. There could even be
a role for a state agent to serve as the surrogate for a group of
stakeholders who are particularly diffuse or difficult to identify, those
whose rights were endangered by reckless behavior, for example. But
government is involved only to make possible a resolution that the
rights-holders deem just under their personal rationales for punishment.
A truly minimal state can neither vindicate its own rights, because it has
none, nor trade in people's rights that it does not legitimately possess.
VII.
To the extent that it reverts control over punishment to the rights-
holders themselves, restorative justice offers a small step away from
omnipotent governance. But it cannot and need not provide a solution
in every dispute. Take, for instance, the aforementioned case of the
battering ballplayer. The actual incident in question involved a
Pittsburgh Pirate first baseman who hit a young stadium worker dressed
93. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133 (1996) (concept of "overlapping
consensus"); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 40 (rev. ed. 1999) ("reflective
equilibrium").
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up as an Italian sausage during the popular costume race at Milwaukee
baseball games. A Brewers official described it as "one of the most
outrageous things I've ever seen inside a ballpark or outside a
ballpark," 4 and "an insane act of a person whose conduct is
unjustifiable."95 The ballplayer was arrested, taken to jail, and booked
for misdemeanor battery.96 But the victim said she received "just a few
scratches" and thought "the whole thing is funny," stating that she didn't
want charges to be filed and instead asked for an apology and an
autographed bat from the offending Pirate.9 7 And when the contrite
ballplayer met these demands, "Sausagegate" was resolved in a manner
respectful of the individual rights at issue and without the need for
further action.
On the other hand, there may be situations where restorative justice
will be considered undesirable by victims (or offenders), but the crimes
still call for punishment. As mentioned, party involvement must be
voluntary in a restorative process, and a victim may have no desire to
interact with the individual who violated his rights. When I suggested at
a lecture in New Zealand that family group conferences should be
extended to adult offenders, an outraged antipodean wrote a letter to
the editor telling me to "get real": "If you take the time to ask victims of
serious crime if they want to be in the same room and breathe the same
air as the person responsible for the plight they find themselves in, I
think the answer would be 'no way!"'99 This person may be right in
many cases, and there are categories of crime (e.g., sex offenses) that I
myself would find inappropriate for restorative justice. But the one who
should be making this judgment is neither me nor my Kiwi critic, but the
individual whose rights were violated.99
This choice to be involved in the vindication (or forfeiture) of one's
94. Brian O'Neill, Why Do Players Treat Performers Like, Uh, Pieces of Meat?,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 13, 2003, at C1.
95. Frank Litsky, A Tap, a Fall and Fury in Milwaukee, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2003, at D1.
96. Litsky, supra note 95.
97. 'Sausagegate' Nets 3-Game Suspension, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison, Wis.), Jul. 12,
2003, at C2; Drew Olson & Reid J. Epstein, Over the Coals: Some Aren't Laughing as Player
Fined for Sausage-Smacking, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 11, 2003, at 1A.
98. Wendy Clark, Letter to the Editor, Family Conferences, DOMINION (Wellington,
N.Z.), July 26, 2000, at 14; Paul Mulrooney, American Expert Advocates Restorative Justice,
Family Conferences, DOMINION (Wellington, N.Z.), July 17, 2000, at 12.
99. Moreover, restorative justice is not the only method of party involvement and
interaction in sentencing issues. Cf Tom Kenworthy, 'I'm Going to Grant You Life': Parents
of Slain Gay Student Agree to Prison for His Killer, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1999, at A2
(describing plea deal brokered by murder victim's family).
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own rights and the opportunity to reach an outcome consistent with
one's own vision of justice seem to me to be key aspects to a libertarian
theory of punishment. That was the problem with scholarship arguing
that a particular sentencing justification should be derived from
libertarianism, given that this political theory endorses pluralism of
thought and accepts only a minimal state. In turn, the practice of plea
bargaining permits government to trade in people's rights without their
consent or participation, marginalizing the input of defendants and
ignoring the opinions of victims. Of course, not all plea bargains will be
reached despite contrary positions of the real rights-holders-but the
justification of punishment that will tend to prevail, sometimes tainted
by self-interest, will be the rationale employed by prosecutors and
defense attorneys.
The most endearing quality of libertarianism is the freedom it
provides all sorts of individuals to structure their lives without direction
from the state, whether they are Amish or Jewish, Hippies or Yuppies,
vegans or pagans, Black Panthers or Gray Panthers, tree-huggers or flat-
earthers, you name it. A libertarian theory of punishment would have
similar aspirations, allowing believers' in retribution, utilitarianism,
restitution, and all other decent justifications to embrace such views
without state approval or rejection, and to have their perspectives
respected when their own rights are at stake. Many details of libertarian
punishment will need to be worked out, I admit, but at least the traces
are there.
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